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Since the beginning of AI, intelligence was conceived as the capacity to solve a problem 
by working on internal representations of problems, i.e. by acting upon “images” or 
“mental models” with simulated actions (“reasoning”), before acting in the world. 
Successively, the concept of “representations” has been attacked in many ways. Recently, 
many converging evidences in psychology and neurobiology indicate a crucial role of 
anticipatory representations for many cognitive functionalities such as visual attention1 
and motor control9. As suggested by the discovery of mirror neurons8, representations are 
mainly action-oriented and deeply based on the motor apparatus. Barsalou2 and Grush4 
try to provide unitary accounts of these phenomena and anticipatory functionalities now 
begin to be explored from a computational point of view9,5. 
We think that by conceiving representations as mainly anticipatory it is possible to 
reframe many of the central claims of AI. In fact, the ability that characterizes and defines 
a “true mind”, as opposed to a merely adaptive systems, is that of building 
representations of the non-existent, of what is not currently (yet) “true” or perceivable. A 
real mental activity begins when the organism is able to endogenously (i.e. not as the 
consequence of current perceptual stimuli) produce an internal perceptual representation 
of the world (“simulation” of perception)3. For example, the organism can generate the 
internal “image” for matching it against perceptual inputs while actively searching for a 
given object or stimulus while exploring the environment; or it can use it as prediction of 
the stimulus that will probably arrive, and match its predictions against actual stimuli, 
and be confirmed, disconfirmed, or surprised. But it can also form mental representations 
of the current word to work on it, modifying this representations for virtually “exploring” 
possible actions, events, results: “what will happen if…?”; or maintain concurrent 
representations, such as motor plans, and select among them. Expectations are not only 
representations: they can have motivational, axiological, or deontic nature; saying us not 
only how the world is, was, will be; but how the world should be, how the organism 
would like the world to be. Anticipatory representations can thus be used as goals driving 
the behavior. This is what mind really is: conceiving and desiring what is not there: the 
presupposition for hallucinations, delirium, desires, and utopias. 
 
We aim at providing a unitary account of the role of anticipation in many cognitive 
functionalities, including sensorimotor interaction with the environment, attention, 
planning and goal selection; and to integrate them into an unitary architectures. 
Anticipatory representations offer two advantages: 1) they make it possible to build up 
more and more complex functionalities exploiting less complex ones (e.g., off-line 
planning exploiting on-line planning); 2) even if they are used for detatching from reality 
(as in visual imagery, or in planning), they are fully grounded: they are acquired in the 
past experience (e.g. with supervised learning9) and can be compared with actual stimuli. 
Fig. 1 shows our model for an oculo-motor coordination system in which many 
concurrent perceptual and motor schemas control a camera and a gripper6,5. In the 
framework of the EU funded project MindRACES (FP6-511931), this model is being 
used for realizing a system that has to pick-up with its gripper insects having different 
sizes, velocity and trajectories on the basis of visual input. 
 
Fig. 1 Coupled perceptual-motor schemas for oculo-motor coordination 
 
In our systems, anticipation has five main roles: 1) Action control: in the case of 
perceptual schemas, this means orienting the fovea towards relevant inputs (e.g., relevant 
colors and trajectories); in the case of the motor schemas, this means selecting the most 
appropriate gripper action (e.g., specialized for quick or slow, big or small insects). 
Moreover, some perceptual and motor schemas are coupled: active perceptual schemas 
specialized in tracking some trajectories or colors pre-activate motor schemas for picking 
related insects and vice versa. 2) Decision: many competing motor plans are generated 
and maintained for the same or for different targets, and choice depends on predictive 
accuracy. Schemas predicting better are selected: the rationale is that schemas predicting 
well are “well attuned” with the current course of events9; prediction is an evaluation of 
schemas efficacy. 3) Replacing the actual input if sensors are unavailable or unreliable. 
4) Compensating time delays. 5) Erasing the auto-generated input (e.g., for avoiding to 
consider as target the own moving gripper). 
The anticipatory representations provided by the forward models (e.g. implemented using 
fuzzy logic or neural networks) offer also a bridge for more complex functionalities such 
as offline planning: possible outcomes of events can be simulated and compared offline 
by exploiting the same machinery involved in online visual and motor planning, but 
without sending commands to the effectors. During this operation the expected stimuli 
replace actual ones and serve as inputs for chaining the schemas. This offers two more 
advantages: 1) “detatching” the representations from the sensorimotor loop by setting up 
hierarchies of schemas representing abstract concepts; 2) using goal states, and not 
current stimuli, for the selection of action. 
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